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The Expansion of Hospital Liability in Illinois:
The Use and Abuse of Apparent Agency
William C. Anderson, III*
and Marilee Clausing**
I.

INTRODUCTION

As medical malpractice awards escalate,1 the plaintiffs' bar is
discovering that the professional liability insurance limits of nonhospital defendants are frequently inadequate to satisfy those verdicts. As a result, hospitals are defendants in suits that would formerly have been directed primarily at individual health care
providers. 2 In support of their search for funds, plaintiffs increasingly have advanced novel theories of hospital liability. One of
the most popular of these theories is the doctrine of apparent or
ostensible agency.4
The Illinois Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to
pass on the apparent agency doctrine as it applies to hospitals in
medical malpractice actions. This Article will argue that adoption
of the doctrine should be avoided because of the practical realities
regarding the ways in which hospitals function and because of
sound public policy reasons.

II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOSPITAL LIABILITY:

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE

Historically, hospitals were immune from liability for the mal* Partner, Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago, Illinois; J.D. cum laude, 1975, Villanova
University; B.A., 1969, Georgetown University.
** Associate, Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago, Illinois; J.D. cum laude, 1985; B.S.N.,
1978, Marquette University.
1. The American Medical Association reports that settlements and awards have broken all records, with multi-million dollar payouts becoming increasingly common.
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, REPORTS 1, 2, & 3 (1984).

2. See Phoenix & Schleuter, Hospital Liabilityfor the Acts of Independent Contractors: The Ostensible Agency Doctrine, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 875 (1986); Slawkowski, Do the
Courts Understand the Realities of Hospital Practices?,22 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 452, 452
(1978).
3. See infra notes 5-97 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 66. The terms apparent agency and ostensible agency are often used
interchangeably.
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practice of their employed doctors and nurses.' The rationale for
this immunity was elaborated in the early 1900's in Justice Cardoza's opinion in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital.'
The plaintiff in Schloendorff complained of a stomach illness and
was admitted as a patient at the Society of New York Hospital.7
The plaintiff was diagnosed as having a fibroid tumor and an operation was performed. 8 Subsequently, the plaintiff suffered gangrene which led to an amputation. The plaintiff sued, alleging that
she had not consented to the operation. The trial court directed a
verdict in favor of the defendant. In affirming the directed verdict,
Justice Cardoza first examined the legal underpinnings of hospital
immunity: the doctrine of implied waiver or charitable immunity
and the relationship between a hospital and its doctors and nurses.9
The settled law regarding charitable immunity at the time was that
one who accepts the benefit of a charity enters a relationship that
exempts one's benefactors from liability for the negligence of its
servants in the administering of the charity.10
The holding of Schloendorffconcerning the relationship between
a hospital and its physicians and nurses was of great impact. The
relationship between a hospital and physician, reasoned Cardoza,
is not one of master and servant because the physician occupies the
position of independent contractor who follows a separate calling,
and is thus separately liable for his own wrongs to his patients."1
Similarly, Justice Cardoza maintained that nurses do not act as
servants of the hospital; rather, nurses act as delegates of their supervising physician.' 2 According to Justice Cardoza, a hospital
merely undertakes to procure the services of medical professionals
who then exercise their skills and judgment in treatment of
patients. II
Over the next forty years, state courts continued to wrestle with
5. See Phoenix & Schlueter, supra note 2, at 876; Slawkowski, supra note 2, at 452;
Note, Medical Malpractice - Ostensible Agency and Corporate Negligence - Hospital
Liability May Be Based on Either Doctrine of Ostensible Agency or Doctrine of Corporate
Negligence, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 551, 553 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Medical Malpractice];
Recent Decisions, Torts - Medical Malpractice- Negligence of Independent Contractor
Physicians Who ProvideSpecialized Services Is Imputed Vicariously to Hospitals Through
Apparent Agency Principles, 55 Miss. L.. 879, 880 (1985).
6. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
7. Id. at 127, 105 N.E. at 92.
8. Id. at 128, 105 N.E. at 93.
9. Id. at 128-29, 105, N.E. at 93.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 129, 105 N.E. at 93.
12. Id. at 133, 105 N.E. at 94-95.
13. Id. at 132, 105 N.E. at 94-95.
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the concept of hospital tort immunity. This continued effort led to
the development4of a distinction between "administrative" acts and
"medical" acts.' Meanwhile, the federal courts rejected the implied waiver or charitable immunity defense entirely.' 5 This rejection was not surprising given that hospitals were evolving into
central loci for the housing of sophisticated and technologically advanced equipment, the purchase, maintenance, and operation of
which might well prove prohibitive to the average physician. Consequently, a symbiosis born of necessity developed between physicians and hospitals. Over time, hospitals changed their character
from their initial existence as simple charitable institutions 16 that
provided bed and board for physicians' patients, into sophisticated,
complex, and integrated corporate entities. They became comprehensive health care centers responsible for arranging, coordinating,
17
and monitoring total health care on a fee-for-service basis.
Furthermore, with the introduction of the modern concept of
liability insurance to cover professional negligence, the traditional
concerns underlying the doctrine of charitable immunity became
much more difficult to apply.18 Hospitals integrated physicians
into their structure and often employed them directly as house
physicians, interns, and residents.' 9 Hospitals utilized a team ap-

proach to health care and provided a variety of functions such as
developing standards and procedures for the appointment and retention of medical staff, maintaining quality control, coordinating
medical and non-medical aspects of treatment into one functional
14. A distinction developed over the years whereby a hospital was held liable for
"administrative acts" while it retained its immunity for the "medical acts" of its physicians. See, e.g., Jones v. New York Hosp., 57 A.D.2d 429, 134 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1954),
rev'd on other grounds, 286 A.D.2d 825, 143 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1955). For examples of administrative acts, see Levin, Hospital's Liability for Independent Emergency Room Service, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 791, 795-96 (1982) (administrative acts include transfer
of patient from one hospital to another, use of electric cautery that ignited alcohol on
patient's abdomen, administration of transfusions without written orders, and having a
suicidal patient moved to a dangerous location).
15. See President & Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
16. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
17. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 491, 154 P.2d 687, 691 (1944). See also
Clifford, Medical Malpractice and the Independent Contractor Defense: Hospitals Do
Practice Medicine, 1981 PERS. INS. ANNALS 315, 315-17; Note, Medical Malpractice,
supra note 5, at 555.
18. See Southwick, HospitalLiability - Tw'o Theories Have Been Merged, THE J. OF
LEGAL MED. 1 (1983).

19. See Nord, The Big Change - Suing Doctors Today Means Suing Hospitals.
Here's Why, 1985 THE BRIEF 7, 7; Note, Theoriesfor Imposing Liability Upon Hospitals
ForMedical Malpractice: Ostensible Agency and CorporateLiability, 11 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 561, 569 (1985) (hereinafter Note, Theoriesfor Imposing Liability].
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unit, 20 providing educational and research opportunities, and furnishing technical and specialist services to their patients and
physicians.2
Recognizing these changes, in 1957 the New York Court of Appeals, in Bing v. Thunig,22 noted the "inconstant course" of the
Schloendorff rule, calling it "riddled with.., exceptions and subjected to various qualifications and refinements. ' 23 Accordingly,
the Bing court held that hospitals would no longer be immune
from tort liability under respondeatsuperior.24 In reaching its decision, the court reviewed the historical underpinnings of the charitable immunity of hospitals.25 It reasoned that hospital immunity
should rest on foundations stronger than those advanced in
Schloendorff26 It pronounced the concept of implied waiver by a
patient of a right to recover
for negligence "logically weak" and
"pretty much a fiction." '27 Likewise, the Bing court found the idea
that professional personnel, such as doctors and nurses, should be
treated as independent contractors when they were in fact employees to be inconsistent and anomalous. 28 The court concluded that
20. See Clifford, supra note 17, at 316.
21. See Angel, Professionalsand Unionization,66 MINN. L. REv. 383, 411-12 (1982).
22. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
23. Id. at 663, 143 N.E.2d at 6, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
24. Id. at 666, 143 N.E.2d at 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11. The Bing court also rejected the
medical/administrative act dichotomy. It quite succinctly outlined the fine distinctions
between administrative and medical acts that had made the classification difficult for the
courts:

Placing an improperly capped hot water bottle on a patient's body is administrative ... while keeping a hot water bottle too long on a patient's body is
medical ....
Administering blood, by means of a transfusion, to the wrong
patient is administrative ... while administering the wrong blood to the right
patient is medical ....
Employing an improperly sterilized needle for a hypodermic injection is administrative... while improperly administering a hypodermic injection is medical.
Id. at 660-61, 143 N.E.2d at 4-5, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 7. See Note, Theories for Imposing
Liability, supra note 19, at 566.
25. Bing, 2 N.Y.2d at 662, 143 N.E.2d at 5, 163 NY.S.2d at 7.
26. Id. at 663, 143 N.E.2d at 6, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
27. Id.
28. Id. The court noted:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient, does
not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead
simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects
the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ
on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and interns, as well as administrative and manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care and
treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action.
Id. at 666, 143 N.E.2d at 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
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hospitals should "shoulder the responsibilities borne by everyone
else."129 Although it cannot be said that Bing was the first decision
to impose vicarious liability upon a hospital for the malpractice of
its professionals, the decision can be used as an arbitrary benchmark for the historical development of hospital liability that
followed.3
The Illinois courts eventually followed New York's lead in rejecting charitable immunity. The Illinois Supreme Court first
adopted the doctrine of charitable immunity in Parks v. Northwestern University,3 I by holding that a charitable institution could not
be found liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the
negligent acts of its agents or employees. The court reasoned that
the funds of a charitable institution acquired and held in trust
could not be diverted from the trust to a person who enjoyed the
benefit of the charity.32 This doctrine was applied to hospitals, as
well as other charitable corporations for approximately four
33
decades.
The doctrine was modified by the Illinois Supreme Court in the
1950 case of Moore v. Moyle.34 In Moore, recovery was allowed
against non-trust funds, such as insurance polities, of charitable
corporations. The court reasoned that the concern over protection
of trust funds was not valid when a policy of insurance existed that
would cover damages.35
29. Id.
30. Before imposing vicarious liability upon a hospital, a determination must first be
made as to whether a master-servant relationship exists. The primary consideration is
the extent of control exercised by the hospital over an individual. See Levin, supra note
14, at 797. A master-servant relationship is one in which the master retains the right to
control the time, manner, and method of performing a job. Id. This "control test" is
conceptually simple but is often difficult to apply. For example, the control exercised by
a hospital as to the time, manner, and method of work perfoemed by a physician or nurse
is often confused with the right to require a certain result or to regulate in general terms
an individual's conduct. Id. See also Malleris, Foltz & Grenier, Special Problems Respecting Institutional Negligence, in Defense Of Medical Malpractice 4-1, 4-14 (Ill. Inst.
for CLE, 1987). Theoretically, if a physician or nurse does not meet the control test,
vicarious liability for negligent acts should not be imputed to the hospital. For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of respondeatsuperior and its application to hospitals, see
Reuter, Toward a More Realistic and Consistent Use of Respondeat Superior in the Hospital, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 601 (1985). See also Southwick, supra note 18, at 1.
31. 218 Il1. 381, 75 N.E. 991 (1905).
32. Id. at 385, 75 N.E. at 993.
33. See Hogan v. Chicago Lying-In Hosp., 335 Ill.
42, 166 N.E. 461 (1929); Maretick
v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 297 Il1. App. 488, 17 N.E. 1012 (1st Dist. 1938);
Olander v. Johnson, 258 Il1. App. 89 (2d Dist. 1930); Haines v. State Board of Agriculture, 184 Ill.
App. 191 (3d Dist. 1913).
34. 405 Ill.
555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950).
35. Id. at 562, 92 N.E.2d at 86.
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Shortly thereafter, in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302,36 the Illinois Supreme Court found that none of the
reasons advanced in support of the closely aligned doctrine of
school immunity maintained viability in modem day society. 7 It
likened the basis for school immunity to the trust fund basis for
charitable immunity, and found that in this day and age such immunity acould not be justified on a protection of public funds
theory. 31
Charitable immunity was officially laid to rest in Illinois in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital 39 In Darling,
the court found that charitable immunity could no longer stand in
light of Molitor. The Darling court reasoned that whether or not
particular assets of a charitable organization are exempt from execution to satisfy a judgment does not determine liability. 40 In addition to abolishing charitable immunity, Darling established the
principle that a hospital, apart from its agents or employees, owed
a duty directly
to patients to supervise the activities of medical staff
physicians. 441
The plaintiff in Darlingsustained a leg fracture during a football
game and was taken to the defendant's emergency room. 42 Dr. Alexander, a medical staff physician on call to the emergency room
that day, casted the leg and placed it in traction. Shortly thereafter, the patient began to complain of pain and his toes began to
swell. Despite palliative measures by Dr. Alexander, the condition
worsened. The patient stayed at Charleston Community Hospital
for two weeks and continued to complain of severe pain. 41 After
transfer to another hospital, it was learned that necrosis of the leg
had set in as a result of an impairment of circulation caused
by
44
constriction of the cast. The leg was eventually amputated.
The plaintiff alleged that the hospital was negligent for failing to
supervise the care and treatment rendered to the plaintiff by the
36. 18 111. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
37. Id. at 25, 163 N.E.2d at 92.
38. Id. at 22, 163 N.E.2d at 94.
39. 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
40. Id. at 337-38, 211 N.E.2d at 260.
41. See Phoenix & Schleuter, supra note 2, at 878; Rapp, Darling and Its Progeny: A
Radical Approach to Hospital Liability, 60 ILL. B.J. 883 (1972); Comment, Piercing the
Doctrine of Corporate HospitalLiability, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 383, 385 (1980). Numer-

ous Illinois cases since Darling, as well as various commentators, have stated otherwise.
See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
42. Darling, 33 Ill. 2d at 326, 211 N.E.2d at 255.
43. Id. at 328-329, 211 N.E.2d at 255.
44. Id. at 329, 211 N.E.2d at 256.
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nurses and Dr. Alexander, failing to require a consultation, and
negligently permitting Dr. Alexander to perform orthopedic procedures for which he was not qualified.4 The hospital defended
maintaining that it could not practice medicine and thus could not
control Dr. Alexander's professional judgment. Moreover, the
hospital asserted that the nurses were executing the legal orders of
the physician rather than the hospital and that therefore it was not
liable for those acts 6
Quoting Bing, the Darling court noted that the traditional notion that a hospital is not responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the acts of its employed health care providers no
longer reflected the realities of practice at modern day hospitals.4
This fact, combined with its abolition of charitable immunity,
formed the basis for its holding that the defendant hospital owed a
duty to supervise the care and treatment rendered to the plaintiff
not only by its nurses, but also by Dr. Alexander. 8
The Darling case illustrates not only the concept of indirect liability imposed upon hospitals by the doctrine of respondeat superior, but also the direct liability imposed by the doctrine of
corporate negligence.4 9 Corporate negligence derives from a hospi45. Id.
46. Id. at 330, 211 N.E.2d at 256. (quoting the defendant's brief). The defendant
argued as follows:
It is a fundamental rule of law that only an individual properly educated and
licensed, and not a corporation, may practice medicine.... Accordingly, a
hospital is powerless under the law to forbid or command any act by a physician or surgeon in the practice of his profession .... A hospital is not an insurer
of the patient's recovery, but only owes the patient the duty to exercise such
reasonable care as his known condition requires and that degree of care, skill
and diligence used by hospitals generally in that community ....
Where the
evidence shows that the hospital care was in accordance with standard practice
obtaining in similar hospitals, and Plaintiff produces no evidence to the contrary, the jury cannot conclude that the opposite is true even if they disbelieve
the hospital witnesses. . . . A hospital is not liable for the torts of its nurse
committed while the nurse was but executing the orders of the patient's physician, unless such order is so obviously negligent as to lead any reasonable person to anticipate that substantial injury would result to the patient from the
execution of such order ....
The extent of the duty of a hospital with respect to
actual medical care of a professional nature such as is furnished by a physician
is to use reasonable care*in selecting medical doctors. When such care in the
selection of the staff is accomplished, and nothing indicates that a physician so
selected is incompetent or that such incompetence should have been discovered,
more cannot be expected from the hospital administration.
Id.
47. Id. at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 259.
48. Id. at 329, 211 N.E.2d at 256.
49. Corporate negligence has been defined as the failure of those entrusted with the
task of providing accommodations and facilities necessary to carry out the charitable
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tal's direct and non-delegable duty as an institution to provide for a
patient's care, safety, and management.50 Prior to Darling, there
were three generally recognized duties that a hospital owed to its
patients:5 ' the exercise of reasonable care in the selection and retention of its staff physicians and employees;5 2 the maintenance of
buildings and grounds;5 3 and the maintenance of hospital equipment.5 4 Commentators have heralded the Darling decision for its
creation of still another duty - supervising the medical care rendered to patients not only by employed physicians but also by independent staff physicians. 55 The Darling court, however, seemed
to view Dr. Alexander as an employed physician because he had
been placed on emergency room call by the hospital. 56 Subsequent
Illinois cases indeed have borne out this fact.5 7 Despite the fact
that the Darlingholding has often been overstated, it is now generally held that a hospital owes a direct duty to patients to supervise
the care and treatment rendered by staff physicians who are independent contractors.5 " In justification for this expansion of hospurpose of the corporation to follow in a given situation the established standard of conduct to which the corporation should conform. See Bader v. United Orthodox Synagogue, 148 Conn. 449, 453, 172 A.2d 192, 194 (1961).
50. Zaremski & Spitz; Liability of a Hospital As An Institution: Are the Walls of
Jericho Tumbling?, 16 FORUM 225 (1980).
51. Southwick, supra note 18, at 17.
52. See, e.g., Hipp v. Hosp. Auth. of Marietta, 104 Ga. App. 174, 121 S.E.2d 273
(1961) (hospital liable for failure to investigate the moral character and background of an
orderly employed by the hospital who later molested a child at the hospital); Garlington
v. Kingsley, 277 So.2d 183 (La. App. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 289 So.2d 88 (La.
1974) (material question of fact existed as to whether hospital was liable on a theory of
corporate negligence for selecting nurses and other employees who were incompetent);
Wilson N. Jones Memorial Hosp. v. Davis, 553 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App. 1977) (hospital
negligent for failing to check orderly's references before hiring him).
53. See Southwick. supra note 18, at 17; Comment, The Hospital-PhysicianRelationship: HospitalResponsibilityfor Malpracticeof Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REV. 385 (1975);
Zaremski & Spitz, supra note 50, at 229.
54. See Southwick, supra note 18, at 18. This particular form of negligence can result
from the on-going use of equipment with a known defect, from misuse of equipment, or
negligent selection of equipment for a particular purpose. See, e.g., Phillips v. Powell, 21
Cal. 39, 290 P. 441 (1930); Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 350 So. 2d 205
(La. App. 1977), reversed, 360 So.2d 1331.
55. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
56. Darling, 33 Ill. 2d at 329, 211 N.E.2d at 256. There is, however, some ambiguity
in that regard. The appellate court referred to him as being "on the medical staff." See
Darling, 50 I1. App. 2d at 268, 200 N.E.2d at 158.
57. See Collins v. Westlake Community Hosp., 12 Ill. App. 3d 847, 847, 299 N.E.2d
326, 328-29 (ist Dist. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 57 Ill. 2d 388, 312 N.E.2d 614
(1974); Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial Hosp., Ass'n., 93 Ill. App. 2d 461, 235 N.E.2d
671, 674 (2d Dist. 1968).
58. See Southwick, supra note 18, at 30. The Darlingcourt also held that hospital bylaws, rules, regulations, licensing requirements, and accreditation standards of The Joint
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pital liability, some commentators have argued that modern-day
hospitals play an active role in patient care and that patients have
come to expect that treatment will be rendered by individuals who
are part of a well-coordinated and efficient hospital team. 9 They
argue that patients expect the hospital to exercise some control
over treatment.w Unfortunately, those commentators view hospitals more as business corporations that exercise control over all
that goes on within their walls rather than as institutional coordinators of care with little, if any, ability or opportunity to influence the individual medical care provided to a patient by his
physicians.61
In response to those commentators' position, it is important to
stress that the structure and function of a business corporation differs significantly from that of a hospital. Business corporations
have a hierarchy of authority wherein each person reports to, and
is directly supervised by, an individual above him on the organizational chart. At the top of the organizational chart is a chief executive officer who is responsible for the actions of those below him
in the hierarchy. He or she exercises control, whether it be direct
or through middle managers, over the method and manner in
which the corporation conducts business. He or she has control
over the actions of those who tend to the corporation's business.
A hospital, like a business corporation, has a hierarchy of authority and an organizational chart. Unlike a business corporation, however, there is a dichotomy of structure within a hospital
that directly influences the manner in which it functions. A hospital's "business" is to provide, in conjunction with its medical staff,
health care services to patients. The medical staff provides the essential medical care; the hospital provides vital support in the form
of facilities, equipment, and ancillary personnel such as nurses, resCommission on Accreditation of Hospitals are admissible as evidence of the standard of
care at the time of trial. Darling, 33 111. 2d at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 260-61. Since Darling,
some courts have used this concept to support liability against hospitals for violations of
such rules, regulations, requirements, and standards on a corporate negligence theory.
See, e.g., Duckett v. North Detroit General Hosp., 84 Mich. App. 426, 269 N.W.2d 626
(1979). Moreover, it is considered to follow therefrom that the failure to institute hospital rules and regulations can, in and of itself, support a finding of corporate negligence.
See, e.g., Keene v. Methodist Hosp., 324 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Ind. 1971); Habuda v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., Inc., 3 N.C. App. 11, 164 S.E.2d 17 (1968).
59. See Note, Independent Duty of a Hospital To Prevent Physicians' Malpractice, 15
ARIZ. L. REV. 953 (1973) [hereinafter Note, Independent Duty of a Hospital]; Note, Theories for Imposing Liability, supra note 19, at 562.
60. See Note, Independent Duty of A Hospital, supra note 59, at 967.
61. For a critique of the trend towards expansion of hospital liability, see Slawkowski, supra note 2.
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idents and technologists. Although a hospital, like a business corporation, may exercise control over the actions of its employees, it
does not exercise control over an independent staff physician's
medical treatment of his or her patients. The medical staff physician does not report to anyone in the hospital administration's hierarchy regarding the manner in which he or she treats his or her
patients. He or she is, in essence, the chief executive officer of the
treatment of his or her patients. The private physician alone exercises control, based upon his or her professional medical judgment,
as to the medical treatment rendered to patients.
Misconstruing a hospital as a business corporation accounts in
great part for the willingness of courts to expand hospital liability.
Of course, in order to impose liability on a hospital under the respondeat superioror corporate negligence theories, either a tort by
a servant/agent/employee or corporate wrongdoing must exist.
Faced with a situation in which neither exists, the plaintiffs' bar
was compelled to rely upon the frequently inadequate resources of
private practitioners to respond in damages. Consequently, the
doctrine of apparent agency developed.
III.

THE EVOLUTION OF APPARENT AGENCY

An apparent agency relationship is said to exist when one party
erroneously leads a third party to believe that another individual is
the agent of the first party.6 2 This concept derives from the Restatement of Agency 63 and the Restatement of Torts.64 Its application to the hospital-independent contractor physician relationship
has but one purpose - to impose liability upon the hospital for the
negligent acts of the physician that result in injury to a patient in
the absence of an employer-employee relationship. The result is
62. See Payne, Recent Developments Affecting a Hospital'sLiabilityfor Negligence of
Physicians, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 389, 398-99 (1977). See also infra note 66.
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1958), which states:
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby
causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such apparent
agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of
care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were

such.
64. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Of TORTS § 429 (1966) which states:
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for another
which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are being rendered
by the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability for physical harm
caused by the negligence of the contractor in supplying such services, to the
same extent as though the employer were supplying them himself or by his
servants.
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that a plaintiff collects money damages from the deepest pocket
available, usually that of the institution.
When discussing the doctrine of apparent agency, three often
interchangeable concepts come into play - actual agency, 65 appar6
ent agency, 66 and estoppel to deny employment.67
Although there
may be academic distinctions to be drawn among the three,68 from
a practical standpoint they are almost always grouped and dis-

cussed together by both courts and commentators.6 9 There are two

65. The application of actual agency principles to a hospital-physician relationship
involves an inquiry as to whether the hospital exercised sufficient control over the actions
of the physicians to impute an agency relationship. The two determinative factors are
usually the extent of control and method of payment. See Greene v. Rogers, 147 Ill. App.
3d 1009, 1014, 498 N.E.2d 867, 871 (3d Dist. 1986).
66. Apparent and ostensible agency are used synonymously, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines an apparent or ostensible agent as follows:
Apparent agent or ostensible agent. One whom the principal, either intentionally
or by want of ordinary care, induces third persons to believe to be his agent,
though he has not, either expressly or by implication, conferred authority on
him. A person who, whether or not authorized, reasonably appears to third
person, because of manifestations of another, to be authorized to act as agent
for such other. Restatement, Second, Agency § 8.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 59 (5th ed. 1979) The interchangeability of the concepts of
ostensible or apparent agency and estoppel to deny employment is illustrated by the following definition given for ostensible agency:
An implied or presumptive agency which exists where one, either intentionally
or from want of ordinary care, induces another to believe that a third person is
his agent, though he never in fact employed him. It is, strictly speaking, no
agency at all, but is in reality based entirely upon estoppeL
Id. at 992 (emphasis added).
These definitions closely parallel the description of apparent agency found in the Restatements. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. Commentators and courts
also often use the concepts of apparent agency and estoppel to deny employment interchangeably. See Malleris, Foltz & Grenier, supra, note 30 at 4-14.
67. The doctrine of estoppel to deny employment requires that the injured plaintiff
rely to his detriment upon the representation of the hospital, whether express or implied,
relative to the relationship between it and the physician. See Greene v. Rogers, 147 Il1.
App. 3d at 1016, 498 N.E.2d at 872 (3d Dist. 1986). See also, Northern Trust v. St.
Francis Hosp., et al, 86-0887 (4th Div. 1988).
68. See, e.g., Beeck v. Tucson General Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153
(1972); Adamski v. Tacoma General Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978);
Phoenix &Schleuter, supra note 2, at 879; Southwick, supra note 18, at 10; Note, Medical
Malpractice,supra note 5, at 560; Note, Theoriesfor Imposing Liability, supra note 19, at
560.
69. See, e.g., Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972);
Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hlosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978); Phoenix &
Schleuter, supra note 2 at 879; Note, Medical Malpractice, supra note 5, at 560; Note,
Theories for Imposing Liability, supra note 19, at 560.
During the publication phase of this Article, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District handed down its opinion in Northern Trust Co. v. St. Francis Hosp., 168 Ill.
App. 3d 270, 522 N.E.2d 699 (1st Dist. 1988). The plaintiff alleged that the emergency
room physician was the apparent agent of the defendant hospital. Regarding the issue of
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requirements to be met in establishing malpractice liability based
upon an apparent agency relationship between a hospital and a
non-employed physician: 1) that the hospital, either through commission or omission, created the appearance that a principal-agent
relationship existed between it and the independent physician; and
2) that the plaintiff reasonably relied upon that appearance and
belief. 70 The patient must further demonstrate that the reliance
caused his injury in some fashion. The central focus of this test is
whether the hospital has, through its actions or lack thereof, induced a patient of ordinary prudence to believe that the physician
was its agent.7 ' Unfortunately, the emphasis is frequently on the
patient's subjective impressions and expectations rather than the
objective issue of what the "prudent person" would believe and the
nature of legal relationship that exists between hospital and
physician.72
Many justify the application of the apparent agency doctrine to
the hospital-physician relationship by pointing to the underlying
apparent agency, the court instructed the jury that the plaintiff had the burden of proving
that: (1) the hospital placed the emergency room physician in a situation that led the
plaintiff to believe, that an agency relationship existed; (2) that the plaintiff relied on the
action of the hospital; and (3) that if the plaintiff had known the physician was not an
agent of the hospital, he would have taken a different course of action. Id. at 277-78, 522
N.E.2d at 704.
On appeal of a verdict for the hospital, the plaintiff argued that the trial judge erred in
giving the above instruction to the jury because "the law of apparent agency does not
require proof of a change in position." Id. at 278, 522 N.E.2d at 704. The court rejected
the plaintiff's argument. It found that the doctrine of apparent agency is based on the
doctrine of equitable estoppel, and that there is no practical difference between them. Id.
Northern Trust illustrates the willingness of courts to interchange the concepts of apparent agency and estoppel to deny employment. Fortunately, the Northern Trust court,
seemingly unlike the Sztorc court, stressed that detrimental reliance cannot be inferred,
but must be proven. CompareNorthern Trust, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 279, 522 N.E.2d at 705,
with Sztorc, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 278, 496 N.E.2d at 1202. See infra notes 160-62.
70. See Phoenix & Schleuter, supra note 2, at 879. Other commentators have outlined up to three or four elements necessary to invoke the doctrine of apparent agency.
See, e.g., Southwick, supra note 18, at 10 (four elements: patient has been invited by
hospital to use the services of the physician; hospital holds itself out as providing a complete range of medical care; patient relies upon these representations; reliance permits
conclusion that the physician is an integral part of the hospital); Note, Medical Malpractice, supra note 5, at 560 (three elements: patient must reasonably believe that the physician is operating under the hospital's authority; the belief must have been generated by
the hospital's act or omission; the patient must have relied upon the representation);
Note, Theories for Imposing Liability, supra note 19, at 573-74 (three elements: the patient must reasonably believe the physician's authority; the hospital's act or omission
must have generated such a belief; the patient who relies upon the physician's authority

must not be negligent).
71. See Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 169 N.J. Super. 575, 580, 405 A.2d 443, 446
(1979).

72. See Payne, supra note 62, at 393; Phoenix & Schleuter, supra note 2, at 881-82.
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assumption that a patient has no duty to inquire about the legal
relationship of the physician to the hospital.13 Essentially, it is presumed that a hospital that holds itself out as having the ability to
provide a service and the necessary personnel impliedly vouches
for the competency of the personnel involved. 4 Apparent agency
is most often relied upon with regard to establishing hospital liability for the conduct of emergency room physicians, pathologists,
radiologists, and anesthesiologists." It also has been used with
surgeons, psychiatrists, and cardiologists. 6 The authors disagree
with those who find the application of the doctrine to such physicians justifiable. It is the authors' opinion that such application is
contrary to established apparent agency case law and the realities
of hospital practice.
One of the earliest cases recognizing apparent agency as a viable
theory for hospital liability was the 1942 California case of Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic.77 Stanhope involved a
radiologist who had complete control over the function and operation of the radiology department and collected his own fees rather
than relying upon the hospital to collect them for him.78 The radiology department, however, was located within the hospital and
the sign that identified the name of the radiology department was
ambiguous as to whether the department was or was not run by the
hospital. 79 These factors were sufficient to allow the court to determine that the radiologist was indeed the apparent agent of the hospital.80 Thirteen years later, California utilized the doctrine again
to find a hospital liable for the actions of an anesthesiologist. 8' Determinative factors included the physician's exclusive work for the
82
hospital and the hospital's supplying of the anesthetic agents.
Many other jurisdictions have followed the Stanhope rationale
and have recognized apparent agency as a viable theory on which
to base hospital liability. 3 The factors and circumstances that a
73. See Howard v. Park, 37 Mich. App. 496, 501, 195 N.W.2d 39, 41-42 (1972);
Note, Theories For Imposing Liability, supra note 19, at 575.
74. See Strodel, Ostensible Agency - Piercing the Veil of Hospital - Physician "Independent Contracts," 1981 PERS. INJ. DESKBOOK 326, 327.
75. See Butler & Laszlo, Hospital Liability foe Physician Negligence in Georgia: A
Realistic Approach, 37 MERCER L. REV. 701, 712 (1986).
76. See Note, Medical Malpractice,supra note 5, at 562.
77. 54 Cal. App. 2d 141, 128 P.2d 705 (1942).
78. Id. at 708.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
82. Id. at 828-30, 291 P.2d at 926-27.
83. See, e.g., Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972);
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court will consider in determining the existence or non-existence of
an apparent agency relationship between a hospital and physician
vary. In addition to the above, consideration thus far has been
given to factors such as whether the patient chose the hospital
rather than the physician; 4 whether there was a pre-existing relationship between patient and physician prior to hospitalization;8"
whether there was payment of a salary by the hospital; 86 whether
there was an exclusive relationship between physician and hospital; 7 the degree of patient reliance on the hospital's reputation as
opposed to reliance on the physician's reputation; 88 the degree of
control exercised by the hospital governing body over the appointment of physicians89 and the hours they work; 9° whether the hospital supplied the equipment and support staff used by the
physician; 9' the nature and extent of the emergency that brought
the patient to the hospital; 92 from whom the bill for services
came; 93 the similarity of dress between hospital employees and the
non-employed physician; 94 and the representations of hospital employees about the status of the non-employee physician. 95
Generally speaking, the factors considered by the courts focus
on the patient's reasonable understanding and belief regarding the
relationship between the hospital and the physician, as well as the
Vanaman v. Milford Memorial Hosp., 272 A.2d 718 (Del. 1970); Irving v. Doctors Hosp.
of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So. 2d 55 (Fla. App. 1982); Steward v. Midani, 525 F. Supp.
843 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Williams v. St. Claire Medical Center, 657 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. App.
1983); Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269, 378 A.2d 1121 (1977); Howard v. Park, 37
Mich. App. 496, 195 N.W.2d 39 (1972); Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 52 A.D.2d 450,
384 N.Y.S. 2d 527 (1976); Rucker v. High Point Memorial Hosp., 20 N.C. App. 650, 202
S.E.2d 610 (1974), Hannola v. Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (1980);
Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 676 P.2d 279 (Okla. App. 1983); Themins v. Emmanuel
Lutheran Charity Bd., 54 Or. App. 901, 637 P.2d 155 (1981); Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 287 Pa. Super. 364, 430 A,2d 647 (1980); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp.,
20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978).
84. See Wilson v. Stilwith, 411 Mich. 587, 309 N.W.2d 898 (1981).
85. Id. See also Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp., 404 Mich, 240, 273 N.W.2d 429
(1978); Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 676 P.2d 279 (Okla. App. 1983).
86. See Greene v. Rogers, 147 Il. App. 3d 1009, 498 N.E.2d 867 (3d Dist. 1986).
87. See Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
88. See Vanaman v. Milford Memorial Hosp., 272 A.2d 718 (Del. 1970).
89. See Hannola v. Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (1980).
90. See Beeck v. Tuscon Gen. Hosp., 18 Ariz. App. 165, 500 P.2d 1153 (1972).
91. Id.
92. See Hannola v. Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (1980).
93. Id.
94. See Porter v. Sisters of St. Mary, 756 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1985).
95. Id. In Porter,a hospital employee told the plaintiff patient that Dr. Schneider, an
independent contractor, was "our best man" or "our best person for the job." This representation was considered to be crucial evidence supporting the plaintiff's claim of apparent agency. Id. at 673-74.
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amount of control exercised by the hospital over the physician.
Many of the same factors looked to by the courts outlined above96
have been considered by Illinois courts when addressing the issue
of apparent
agency relative to an independent contractor
97
physician.

IV.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF APPARENT AGENCY IN ILLINOIS

Despite other jurisdictions' expansion of hospital liability as
early as the 1940's,9" Illinois only recently employed apparent
agency principles to do so. 9 The earliest attempts in Illinois to
hold hospitals liable for the alleged negligent acts of non-employed
physicians were based on actual agency theories.loc These early
cases did not consider apparent agency or estoppel as viable alternatives to an actual agency relationship.
For example, in Hundt v. Proctor Community Hospital,01 1 the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant hospital was vicariously liable
for the misconduct of the surgeon who was "a member of the active medical staff" at the hospital.0" The surgeon allegedly had
performed a surgical procedure on the plaintiff that was different
from that to which she had consented.103 This different procedure
resulted in the plaintiff's total paralysis.
The plaintiff did not assert independent wrongdoing on the hospital's part under the doctrine of corporate negligence nor did she
allege vicarious liability for the wrongdoing of the hospital's employees. Rather than attempting to assert an apparent agency relationship between the hospital and surgeon in order to impute the
surgeon's negligence to the hospital, the plaintiff alleged that the
relationship between the hospital and surgeon was an agency relationship because the surgeon and hospital were acting as "joint
96.
97.

See supra notes 77-82, 84-95 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.

98. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
99. See Sztorc v. Northwest Hosp., 146 Ill. App. 3d 275, 496 N.E.2d 1200 (1st Dist.
1986).
100. See. e.g., Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 Iil. App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d 198 (1st
Dist. 1979); Hundt v. Proctor Community Hosp., 5 111. App. 3d 987, 284 N.E.2d 987 (3d

Dist. 1972). For a discussion of the distinction between actual agency and the closely
related theories of apparent agency and estoppel to deny agency, see supra notes 65-67
and accompanying text.

101.

5 Ill. App. 3d 987, 284 N.E.2d 676 (3d Dist. 1972).

102.

Id. at 989, 283 N.E.2d at 678.

103.

The plaintiff signed a consent for a "spinal fusion, and such additional opera-

tions or procedures as are considered therapeutically necessary. . .

."

Id. at 988, 283

N.E.2d at 677. According to the medical records, a spinal fusion was not performed.
Instead, a rhizotomy of the left thoracic vertebra was done. Id.
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venturers.""°4 The court noted that it was undisputed that the surgeon was engaged in private practice, was a member of the independent medical staff, and, more importantly, did not receive a
salary or other compensation from the defendant hospital. 05 Interestingly, the court did not dwell upon the issue of control except
to note that the surgical consent that was obtained from the patient
by the nurse was executed at the direction of the surgeon." °
The court summarily dismissed the plaintiff's agency allegation
by noting that the joint venturer theory had never been applied to
the physician-hospital relationship and that such a relationship was

different from the typical joint venturer situation.0 7 The court

continued by emphasizing the traditional view of the staff physi104. Id. at 989-90, 284 N.E.2d at 678.
105. Id.
106. One of the determinative factors to the establishment of an agency relationship
is whether the hospital exercised sufficient control over the actions of the physician. See
supra note 65. See also Greene v. Rogers, 147 Il. App. 3d 1009, 1014, 498 N.E.2d 867,
871 (3d Dist. 1986). For an in-depth discussion of the control factor as explained by the
Greene court, see infra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
107. In attempting to establish that the hospital and physician were joint venturers,
plaintiff relied upon Carroll v. Caldwell, 12 Ill.
2d 487, 147 N.E.2d 69 (1958), and Ditis v.
Ahlvin Const. Co., 408 11. 416, 97 N.E.2d 244 (1951). See Hundt, 5 Ill. App. 3d at 99091, 284 N.E.2d at 678. The Carroll court noted that courts have not laid down an exact
definition of what constitutes a joint venture. The answer depends upon the terms of the
particular agreement, the construction that the parties have given to the agreement, and
the nature of the undertaking. Characteristics and elements of a joint venture were outlined: A joint venture contemplates an enterprise that is jointly undertaken - it is an
association of joint undertakers to carry out a single project for profit; there must be a
community of interest in accomplishing a common purpose, a proprietary interest in the
subject matter of the enterprise, a right to direct and govern policy and a duty to share in
profit and losses. Carroll, 12 Ill. 2d at 496-97, 147 N.E.2d at 74. The relationship is a
matter of intent and arises only when the parties intended to associate themselves. Id. In
rejecting the joint venture theory, the Hundt court noted that the joint venturers found in
the above cases did not involve a hospital-physician relationship. The only element that
the hospital-physician relationship met was that there was a community of interest in
promoting the good health of patients. Hundt, 5 Ill.
App. 3d at 990, 284 N.E.2d at 678.
Recently, in Barton v. Evanston Hosp., 159 11. App. 3d 970, 513 N.E.2d 65 (1st Dist.
1987), the Appellate Court for the First District held as a matter of law that a hospital
could not be held vicariously liable for the actions of an independent physician on a joint
venturer theory. The court found that a joint venture would not be imputed to the hospital-physician relationship because joint control is missing in such a relationship. The
court rejected plaintiff's contention that such joint control exists when a hospital supplies
a physician with materials and personnel and, likewise, when the physician directs and
controls the actions of the personnel supplied by the hospital. Interestingly, the First
District considers such factors to be insufficient to support a claim of joint venture but
sufficient to support a claim of apparent agency. Surely it should be more difficult to
prove that a hospital is solely responsible for the actions of an independent physician in
treating his patients within its walls than to prove joint responsibility between physician
and hospital for such medical treatment.
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cian/hospital relationship as an "independent relationship."' 01
Although the court acknowledged that the both hospital and physician had to cooperate with each other for the purposes of the
hospitalization it pointed out that necessity for cooperation did not
nullify the independent roles of each."09
Consistent with Hundt is Johnson v. St. BernardHospital.10 In
Johnson, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District was
confronted again with a situation in which a plaintiff attempted to
hold a hospital liable for the allegedly negligent acts of an independent physician, in this case an emergency room physician.
The court reiterated the traditional rule that "the decision to treat
a patient in a particular manner is a medical question entirely
within the discretion of the treating physician, not the hospital,
and the negligence of a physician in the treatment of a patient cannot be imputed to the hospital where the physician is not an agent
or under the direction of the hospital."" ' The court further noted
that although a hospital may be liable for injuries to a patient
caused by its agents or employees," 2 it could not be held liable for
the acts of one who renders medical care as an independent contractor outside of the hospital's control.' '3 Because it was undisputed that the emergency room physician was not employed or
paid by the hospital, the court found that the physician did not
have the requisite employer-employee or principal-agent relationship with the hospital 4to impose vicarious liability under a respondeat superior theory.",
As an alternative to her actual agency theory, the plaintiff asserted that the hospital should be held liable for the acts of the
independent contractor physician because he performed functions
108. Hundt, 5 Ill.
App. 3d at 990, 284 N.E.2d at 678.
109. Id.
110. 79 Ill.
App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d 198 (Ist Dist. 1979)
Ill. Id. at 714, 399 N.E.2d at 203 (citing Collins v. Westlake Community Hosp., 12
Ill. App. 3d 847, 299 N.E.2d 326 (1st Dist. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 57 I1. 2d 388,
312 N.E.2d 614 (1974); Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 93 111. App. 2d 461,
255 N.E.2d 671 (2d Dist. 1968)).
112. Id. (citing Foster v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 19 Ill.
App. 3d 1055, 313 N.E.2d
255 (1st Dist. 1974)).
113. Id. (citing Hundt v. Proctor Community Hosp., 5 Ill.
App. 3d 987, 284 N.E.2d
676 (3d Dist. 1972); Stern v. Baum, 89 11. App. 2d 142, 232 N.E.2d 96 (1st Dist. 1967)).
114. Id. at 715, 399 N.E.2d at 203. Unlike the plaintiff in Hundt, the plaintiff in

Johnson also alleged that the hospital was directly negligent in failing to ensure that the
patient got prompt and adequate attention and in failing to assure proper and adequate
orthopedic consultation. Id. at 711, 399 N.E.2d at 201. Relying upon Darling,the court
found this theory created a question of fact sufficient to defeat the defendant hospital's
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 718, 399 N.E.2d at 204-06.
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statutorily prescribed to the hospital.' 5 The First District summarily dismissed this assertion, finding that the statutory provision
upon which the plaintiff relied was not broad enough to impose
upon the hospital the duty to practice medicine
within an indepen16
facility.
room
emergency
operated
dently
Illinois first recognized and applied the apparent agency doctrine
to a medical malpractice case in Gasbarra v. St. James Hospital."'
The plaintiff brought a wrongful death action pursuant to the decedent's emergency room treatment at the defendant hospital. The
hospital's emergency room was managed by an independent professional corporation, Doctors Emergency Care Association
("DECA"). Pursuant to a written agreement with the hospital,
DECA was to provide physicians' services to all patients brought
to the emergency room." 8 The agreement further provided that
the hospital was to furnish all non-physician personnel as well as
all supplies, space, and equipment necessary for the operation of
the emergency department." 9 A DECA physician provided emer-

gency care to the decedent.' 20

The plaintiff sued the hospital alleging that the DECA physicians were the agents of the defendant hospital' 2' or, in the alterna115. Id. at 715, 399 N.E.2d at 203. The plaintiff relied upon a provision of "An Act
Requiring Hospitals to Render Hospital Emergency Services," ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
111 '/2, para. 86 (1977), which provided that "every licensed hospital that provided general medical and surgical hospital services shall provide a hospital emergency service."
116. Johnson, 79 Ill. App. 3d at 715, 399 N.E.2d at 203.
117. 85 Ill. App. 3d 32, 406 N.E.2d 544 (1st Dist. 1979). The Gasbarra case involved
an appeal by the plaintiff, after a verdict for the hospital, of the trial court's denial of her
motion for a directed verdict. The initial hearing on plaintiff's appeal was held on December 7, 1979. On June 20, 1980, a hearing was held on the plaintiff's petition for
rehearing. The plaintiff contended in her petition that the appellate court had misunderstood the nature of her motion for directed verdict at the trial level. The court viewed
plaintiff's motion for directed verdict as a single motion for directed verdict on the issue
of liability. The plaintiff claimed that her motion was also a motion on various other
issues, including the nature of the defendant hospital's relationship with the emergency
room physicians. Id. at 42, 406 N.E.2d at 553. For a discussion of the controversy relative to that relationship, see infra notes 121-40 and accompanying text. Although plaintiff's petition for rehearing was denied, it is the appellate court's supplemental opinion on
the denial of the rehearing that contains the court's discussion of the nature of the relationship between the hospital and non-employee physicians. Gasbarra, 85 Ill. App. 3d at
43-45, 406 N.E.2d at 553-55.
118. Id. at 44, 406 N.E.2d at 554.
119. Id. at 43, 406 N.E.2d at 554.
120. Id..
121. Id. at 35, 406 N.E.2d at 548. The plaintiff did not name DECA or the individual physicians as defendants in the action. Id. at 41, 406 N.E.2d at 552. She named only
the defendant hospital. In order to impute the physicians' alleged wrongdoing to the
hospital, she attempted to prove that the physicians were the agents of the hospital. In
one portion of the opinion, when discussing the plaintiff's contention that she should
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tive, that the hospital should be equitably estopped from denying
an agency relationship.122 Neither DECA nor the emergency room
physicians were named in the suit. The Gasbarra court properly
noted that the right to control the manner in which work is to be
performed is the predominant factor to be considered in determining whether a principal-agency relationship exists 23 and that the
resolution of that question depends upon the particular circumstances of each case.1 24 Because the plaintiff was appealing from a
denial of a directed verdict, the court emphasized that the issue of
whether one is an agent or an independent contractor is generally a
queston of fact,
"unless the relationship is so clear as to be
25
undisputed."'1

In its analysis of whether the physicians were the agents of the
hospital, the court looked to a number of factors: the fact that the
hospital provided the facilities, equipment, ancillary personnel, and
forms used by the emergency department; the fact that on the four
occasions the decedent was seen in the emergency room; the fact

that the plaintiff was never informed that DECA, and not the hospital, managed and operated the emergency room; the fact that all
billings were prepared and sent to the plaintiff by the hospital; the
fact that the consent-for-treatment form signed by the plaintiff
gave consent to the hospital for treatment of the decedent; and the
fact that the name
of DECA did not appear on any of the bills or
26
consent forms. 1
The court also scrutinized the agreement between DECA and
the hospital. It noted that the agreement provided that DECA was
to supply uninterrupted emergency medical services, employ physicians to provide those services, supervise, direct, and operate the
have been allowed to question the president of DECA as an adverse witness, the court
noted that the plaintiff alleged that the DECA physicians "were the actual or apparent
agents of the defendant." Id. (emphasis added). When discussing the nature of the relationship between the hospital and the DECA physicians relative to the question of agency
in the supplemental opinion, however, the court merely spoke in terms of actual agency
or estoppel to deny agency, not apparent agency. It well could be that the Gasbarra
court, like many other courts and commentators was using the terms of actual agency,
apparent agency, and estoppel to deny agency interchangeably. See supra notea 65-70
and accompanying text.
122. Gasbarra,85 I11.
App. 3d at 44, 406 N.E.2d at 554.
123. Id. at 43, 406 N.E.2d at 553 (citing Allstate Insurance Co. v. National Tea Co.,
25 I1l. App. 3d 449, 323 N.E.2d 521 (1975)). For a discussion of the role control plays in
the determination of whether an agency relationship exists, see supra note 65.
124. Id. (citing Yuhas v. Allis-Chalmers Distrib. Corp., 12 Ill. App. 3d 814, 299
N.E.2d 166 (1973)).
125. Id. (citing Blake v. Dickinson, 31 Ill. App. 3d 379, 332 N.E.2d 575 (1975)).
126. Id. at 43-44, 406 N.E.2d at 554.
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department, and maintain quality control of the medical services
rendered to patients entering the emergency room.1 27 The agreement also provided that DECA physicians were to be "of a superior quality consistent with the requirements of the hospital" and
that their responsibilities for patient care were to be "inaccordance
with the standards established therefore by the administration of
the hospital."' 128 The plaintiff argued that these provisions of the
agreement illustrated that the physicians were the agents of the
hospital because they were contractually bound to obey rules
promulgated by the hospital, thus implying control over their activities by the hospital. 129 To counter the plaintiff's argument, the
hospital emphasized the fact that all of the physicians were employed by DECA, not by the hospital, and that they were completely in control of the medical care given to emergency
patients. 3 ' The hospital argued that it could not exercise control
over the manner in which a DECA physician treated a patient, and
that DECA promulgated its own rules and regulations
that took
31
regulations.
and
rules
hospitals
the
over
precedence
After enumerating the above factors, the Gasbarra court made
no comment upon whether the circumstances warranted a finding
that there was or was not an agency relationship between the
DECA physicians and hospital. Rather, because the case was
before them on an appeal from a denial of a directed verdict, the
court merely stated that it could not say that an agency relationship was so clear as to be undisputed. 32 Therefore, the factual
question went to the jury who, upon consideration of the numerous
factors relative to the issue of control, found
in the defendant hos33
agency.
of
question
the
on
pital's favor
127. Id. at 44, 406 N.E.2d at 554.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. The standard for a directed verdict is whether all of the evidence, when
viewed in the aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based upon the evidence could stand. Pedrick v. Peoria &
Eastern R.R. Co., 37 I1. 2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14 (1967). The evidence
presented failed to meet this standard. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict was denied and the agency question was submitted to the jury.
133. Gasbarra, 85 111. App. 3d at 34, 406 N.E.2d at 547. A special interrogatory was

submitted to the jury inquiring as to whether the jury found the emergency room physicians to be independent contractors. It was answered in the affirmative. Id. The plaintiff
contended that such an interrogatory should not have been submitted to the jury and

that, in any event, the finding that the DECA physicians were independent contractors
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 37, 406 N.E.2d at 549. The
plaintiff had objected to the special interrogatory on the grounds that it should not be
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Arguing in the alternative, the plaintiff contended that a verdict
should have been directed in her favor as to the agency issue on the
basis of estoppel.'34 Because this was a case of first impression, the
court reviewed the basic principles of law relative to estoppel. The
court noted that:
Equitable estoppel may be defined as the effect of the voluntary
conduct of a party whereby he (or she) is absolutely precluded
from asserting rights which might otherwise have existed as
against another person who has, in good faith, relied upon such
conduct and has been led thereby to change his position for the
worse,1 35and who on his part acquired some corresponding
rights.

The court stressed that in order to apply the doctrine of estoppel,
there must have been reliance in good faith upon the conduct of
another and a change of position for the worse as a result of the
reliance.1 3 6 Neither element was the subject of specific testimony
at the time of trial. Yet the court, in a move that was perhaps an
omen of the First District's willingness to utilize the doctrine to
hold hospitals responsible for the negligence of non-employed physicians,' 31 found that the facts presented to the jury could readily
support the assumption that the plaintiff relied on the hospital's
conduct. 38 Fortunately, the court did not assume that there was
also a change of position by the plaintiff. It reasoned that the
plaintiff brought the decedent to the hospital for medical care that
submitted because it would not control the general verdict. Although the court concluded that the special interrogatory should not have been submitted, the fact that it was,
was not in and of itself reversible error because there was little indication that the jury
had been confused by the interrogatory to the detriment of plaintiff. Id. at 39, 406
N.E.2d at 551.
134. Id. at 44, 406 N.E.2d at 554.
135. Id. at 44-45, 406 N.E.2d at 554 (quoting Siavis v. Siavis, 12 I11.App. 3d 467,
473, 299 N.E.2d 413, 417 (1973)).
136. Id. at 45, 406 N.E.2d at 555 (citing Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. D.F.
Best, Inc. 56 Il1.App. 3d 960, 372 N.E.2d 829 (1977), and Atwater v. Atwater, 18 I11.
App. 3d 202, 309 N.E.2d 632 (1974)). The court quoted ILLINoIs LAW & PRACTICE on
estoppel as follows:
Since the doctrine of estoppel is invoked to prevent injustice or a fraudulent
result, there can be no estoppel where.., the person claiming equitable estoppel
has not been induced to alter his position in such a way that he will be injured if
the other person is not held to the representation. It is not necessary, however,
that actual malice motivate the representations or conduct which have been
acted on to work an estoppel, so long as there is a change in position by the
adverse party to his detriment.
18 ILL L. & PRAC. Estoppel § 234 (1956).
137. See infra notes 144-64 and accompanying text.
138. Gasbarra, 85 III. App. 3d at 45, 406 N.E.2d at 555.
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she indeed received, albeit allegedly improperly.' 39 Because the
plaintiff did not contend that she would have taken other action
had she been informed that the physicians were not employees of
the hospital, the court quite appropriately would not apply the
doctrine of estoppel to the facts of the case."
Although Gasbarra involved a discussion of the concepts of actual agency and estoppel to deny agency, and not apparent agency
per se, many of the factors that the court enumerated in its analysis
of the facts are factors that the First District later would utilize in
applying the doctrine of apparent agency to the hospital/independent physician relationship.' 4' Although the Gasbarra court properly noted that control over the manner in which the work was
performed was the predominant factor to be considered in determining whether an agency relationship existed, 42 the numerous
factors enumerated went well beyond the issue of control.' 43 In
short, Gasbarrainvolved use of apparent agency considerations in
addressing an actual agency question. Although it did not apply
the doctrine of apparent agency to the facts before it, there was an
implicit willingness to do so if confronted with differ It facts in the
future.
Such a set of facts presented themselves in the 1986 case of
Sztorc v. Northwest Hospital.' The Sztorc case involved the plaintiff's appeal of the trial court's order granting summary judgment
to the defendant hospital. 'M The summary judgment was granted
because the court found as a matter of law that the hospital was
not liable under a theory of apparent agency for allegedly negligent
treatment rendered to the plaintiff by an independent group of
radiologists practicing on the hospital premises.' 46 The plaintiff
contended on appeal that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
143. For example, the fact that the plaintiff was never informed that DECA, and not
the hospital, managed the emergency room, and the fact that DECA's name did not
appear on the bills or consent forms are not relevant to the issue of control but rather are
matters that might cause a reasonably prudent plaintiff to believe that the doctors are the
agents of the hospital. Likewise, the question of who provided the equipment, facilities,
and ancillary personnel for emergency care says little about who controlled the manner in
which the physician provided medical care to the emergency room patients.
144. 146 I1. App. 3d 275, 496 N.E.2d 1200 (Ist Dist. 1986).
145. Id. at 276, 496 N.E.2d at 1200.
146. Id.
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the apparent agency question.'4 7
The plaintiff underwent a right radical mastectomy at the defendant hospital.' 4 The surgery was performed by Dr. Khodadad,
a surgeon and named defendant in the action. The plaintiff was
also under the care of her longtime family physician, Dr. Schroeder, who was also named as a defendant. Following the plaintiff's
discharge from the hospital, Dr. Schroeder prescribed outpatient
radiation therapy and told the plaintiff to go to the defendant hospital for the treatments. She received thirty one sessions of radiation therapy at the hospital in the radiation department over a
period of approximately five weeks.
Over the following three years the plaintiff noticed a gradual loss
of functiori ,n her rigit arm. Drs. Khodadad and Schroeder assured her t,viat her arm function would improve over time. Thereafter, the plaintiff underwent surgery on her right brachial plexus
and discovered that her arm had been permanently damaged as a
result of overexposure to radiation.' 49 The plaintiff attempted to
impute the radiologists' liability to the defendant hospital through
use of the apparent agency doctrine.
The court outlined the undisputed facts relevant to the plaintiff's
claim of apparent agency.' 50 First, the radiology department at the
defendant hospital was comprised of a group of physicians operating under the name of "IG Radiology."'' That department was
owned, operated, and staffed by Dr. Irving Greenberg, whose initials presumably generated the departmental name. Although each
of the radiologists in the group had staff privileges at the hospital,
none of them were actually employees. Furthermore, all of the
equipment used for radiation therapy was owned by Dr. Greenberg, and he was solely responsible for its repair, maintenance, and
calibration. Dr. Greenberg billed the radiology patients directly
and each bill contained only Dr. Greenberg's name. The hospital
did not receive any revenues for the radiation treatments provided
by Dr. Greenberg's group.
The radiology department was located on the main floor of the
hospital and in order to reach it, patients had to enter through the
hospital's main entrance and proceed through the lobby and down
a main hallway through a set of swinging doors labeled "X-ray
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 276-77, 496 N.E.2d
Id. at 276, 496 N.E.2d at
Id. at 276, 496 N.E.2d at
Id. at 277, 496 N.E.2d at
Id.

at 1201.
1200.
1200-01.
1201.
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Department." The doors also bore the names of Dr. Greenberg
and the other physicians, as well as the designation "Department
of Radiation Therapy." The same radiology department serviced
both inpatients and outpatients, all of whom were scheduled for
appointments by a technician that was employed by Dr. Greenberg. Finally, there was not a dress code or other manner by
which patients could distinguish Dr. Greenberg's employees from
the hospital's employees.
The Sztorc court commented that summary judgment "is a drastic method of disposing of litigation"'' 52 and that it should not be
granted when there exists a triable issue of fact, such as when there
are undisputed material facts from which reasonable persons might
draw different inferences. 5 3 The court then summarily concluded
that "[o]ur courts have consistently found the question of agency
to constitute slich an issue of fact."'' 54 Reasoning that it was well
settled after Darling that even absent an actual agency relationship
a hospital could be held liable for the acts of independent physicians practicing on the premises, 55 the Sztorc court outlined the
use of the apparent agency doctrine in the other jurisdictions. 56 It
rationalized that the doctrine's purpose was to preclude the entry
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 Il1. App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d 198
(1st Dist. 1979), appeal denied, 79 Ill 2d 631 (1979)). Specifically, Johnson noted that
"[a] triable issue precluding summary judgment exists where there is a dispute as to material facts, or where, the material facts being undisputed, reasonable persons might draw
different inferences from the facts." Johnson, 79 Ill. App. 3d at 714, 399 N.E.2d at 202.
154. Sztorc, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 277, 496 N.E.2d at 1201 (citing Barkhausen v.
Naugher, 395 Ill. 562, 70 N.E.2d 565 (1947) and Sherman v. Field Clinic, 74 Ill. App. 3d
21, 392 N.E.2d 154 (1st Dist. 1979)). Interestingly, the Sherman case did not involve a
motion for summary judgment nor did it address the question of whether the existence of
an agency relationship is a question of fact that must be submitted to a jury. The case
involved a motion to dismiss that attacked the sufficiency of a complaint that alleged all
agency relationship. The court did not reach the underlying question of whether the
absence of an agency relationship is properly raised in a motion to dismiss because the
movant failed to attach the requisite affidavit in support of its motion. Sherman, 74 Il.
App. 3d at 26, 392 N.E.2d at 158.
Additionally, it should be noted that the Barkhausen case cited by plaintiff did not
state that the determination as to whether a-. agency relationship exists is a question of
fact for the jury. Rather, it held that the determination as to whether a known agent was
authorized to act was a question of fact to be submitted to a jury. Barkhausen, 395 Ill. 2d
at 566, 70 N.E.2d at 567.
155. Sztorc, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 278, 496 N.E.2d at 1201 (citing Darling v. Charleston
Community Mem. Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
946 (1966)). Although the Sztorc court said it was "well settled" that Darling stood for
this proposition you may recall that the Darling court made no reference to the employment status of the physician in question and may well have considered him to be an
employed physician. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
156. Sztorc, 146 11. App. 3d at 278, 496 N.E.2d at 1201-02.
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of summary judgment "under circumstances where a person, like
plaintiff here, goes to a hospital which holds itself out as a full
service institution offering a range and variety of services such as
radiation treatment under the assumption that such services are in
fact being provided by the hospital." 1 7 The court noted that the
use of the doctrine in other jurisdictions rested upon the presumption that when a person goes to a full service hospital for care and
treatment, "he or she does so in reliance upon the reputation of the
institution and the skill and expertise of its personnel." 158 It further noted that the underlying rationale behind those holdings was
that patients, who are generally unaware of the independent status
of the treating physicians, should not be bound by the "secret limitations" that are contained in
a private contract between a hospital
59
and independent physician.
The defendant hospital contended that the plaintiff's claim that
the radiologists were the apparent agents of the hospital should be
defeated because she failed to show good faith reliance upon the
hospital's expertise and a holding out or inducement to accept
treatment there.160 The defendant pointed to the plaintiff's deposition testimony wherein she stated that she did not know whether it
would have made any difference to her if the radiologists had been
in private practice or employed by the hospital.' 6' The court im157. Id.
158. Id. at 278, 496 N.E.2d at 1202 (citing Stanhope v. Los Angeles College of Chiropractic, 54 Cal. App. 2d 141, 128 P.2d 705 (1942); Smith v. St. Francis Hosp., 676 P.2d
279 (Okla. App. 1983); Hannola v. Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d 61, 426 N.E.2d 1187
(1980); Themins v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 54 Or. App. 901, 637 P.2d 155
(1981); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970 (1978)). The
court also cited Holton v. Resurrection Hosp., 88 Il1.App. 3d 655, 410 N.E.2d 969 (1st
Dist. 1980) for the proposition that the mere fact that treatment is rendered on a hospital's premises creates a presumption of agency at least for purposes of determining the
sufficiency of a complaint. The Holton court's finding was indeed limited to precisely that
situation, i.e. determining the sufficiency of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, and
should not be so broadly interpreted as to create a presumption of agency in any other
situation where an allegation of apparent agency is made.
159. Sztorc, 146 11. App. 3d at 278, 496 N.E.2d at 1202.
160. 146 Ill. App. 3d at 278-79, 496 N.E.2d at 1202.
161. Id. The colloquy was as follows:
Q: Inasmuch as Dr. Schroeder ha[d] recommended that you go to the radiation
therapy department for treatment, would it have made any difference to you,
one way or the other, whether or not Dr. Greenberg and Dr. Bluhm were in
private practice or whether they were employed by Northwest Hospital?
A: I don't know.
Q: You don't know whether it would have made any difference?
A: I don't know.
Q: So you don't know now, and you didn't know then, is that right?
A: I don't know.
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plicitly agreed with the hospital's assertion that it was necessary to
find that the plaintiff would have acted differently had she known
of the contractual agreement between the radiologists and hospital.
Rather than accept her deposition testimony as dispositive of that
issue, however, the court decided that a question of fact62remained
as to whether she would have indeed acted differently.1
The court concluded that it disagreed with the trial court's assessment that there was no basis in the evidence for holding the
defendant liable under a theory of apparent agency.' 63 It held that
"the totality of facts in the instant case could lead a normal person,
such as plaintiff, to reasonably believe that the radiology services
being provided to her were in fact being provided by defendant
hospital, and that a triable issue of fact with respect to apparent
agency therefore exists which must preclude summary judg-

ment.," '6
The Szortc court's unprecedented adoption of the apparent
agency doctrine in Illinois was uncalled for and poorly reasoned
with respect to the specific facts before it. The court gave no sound
reason for the adoption of the apparent agency doctrine in a medical malpractice case in Illinois. The long-standing traditional rule
in Illinois had been that the decision to treat a patient in a particular manner was a medical question entirely within the discretion of
the treating physician, rather than the hospital, and that the negligence of a physician treating a patient could not be imputed to the
hospital where the physician was an independent contractor. 6
The staff physician-hospital relationship was seen as an independent relationship and mutual cooperation between the two did not
require abandonment of the independent roles of each. 66 The
Sztorc court cited the Darling case for the erroneously broad proposition that a hospital could be held liable for the acts of independent physician on the premises even absent an agency
relationship. 67 It seemed to believe that adoption of the apparent
agency doctrine was a logical extension of the Darling decision.
The court's belief in that regard was misguided - it involved a
basic misconstruction of the Darling court's holding and it employed a leap in logic that ignored the traditional common law
Id.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 279, 496 N.E.2d
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 111-13
See supra notes 108-09
See supra notes 55-56,

at 1202.

and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
155 and accompanying text.
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the realities of hospital

practices. 168
In validating apparent agency as a theory of recovery for the
plaintiff, the court confused the nature of the relationship between
a principal and an independent contractor.'6 9 When a principal
merely delegates, as did the hospital to the radiologists in Sztorc, it
is not liable for the negligence of the contractor.' 70 It is only when
a principal exercises control over the manner in which the contractor performs the work that it may be held liable.' 7 1 In an agency or
employment relationship, the principal or employer has the absolute right to supervise, direct, and control the activities of the
agent. It is because of this high degree of control that courts have
found it just to impute liability for the agent's or employee's ac72
tions to the principal or employer.'
In contrast, a hospital has no power to control the medical decisions of the independent physician concerning his care and treatment of a patient.' 73 Although hospital by-laws, rules, regulations,
policies, and procedures may contain general guidelines regarding
independent staff physicians, they do not contain guidelines or
mandates regarding the specifics of medical treatment. Moreover,
the Sztorc case did not involve allegations of liability for violations
of by-laws or for a failure to insist that rules be followed. Thus,
any control allegedly imposed by them was not at issue. Most
rules and regulations are procedural or organizational in nature
and are necessary for uniformity and for the efficient operation of a
large institution. Agreeing to abide by a hospital's rules and regulations represents more a spirit of cooperation between hospital
and physician than evidence of control. In short, the decision to
treat a patient in a particular manner still remains a medical question entirely within the treating physician's discretion and control.
As such, there is no sound reason for disrupting the traditional rule
of non-liability for hospitals for the actions of its independent
physicians.
Even if there were sound reasons for the adoption of the apparent agency doctrine, the Sztorc case did not present facts that war168. For an in-depth commentary upon the unique nature of the hospital-physician
relationship, see Slawkowski, supra note 2, at 452.
169. See Malleris, Foltz and Grenier, supra note 30, at 4-14.

170.

Id.

171. Id.
172. Id. at 4-14 to 4-15.
173. See Nagib v. St. Therese Hosp. Inc., 41 111. App. 3d 970, 355 N.E.2d 211 (2d
Dist. 1976).
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ranted its application. Under Illinois law, "apparent authority"
generally arises when the principal creates, by its words or conduct, the reasonable impression in a third party that the agent has
authority to perform on the principal's behalf. 74 The court
seemed to place a great deal of weight upon the fact that the radiology department was physically located within the hospital and that
patients had to walk through the main lobby and down a corridor
to get to the department.1 75 Such emphasis seems to imply that the
mere fact that the care was rendered on the hospital's premises
raises a presumption of an agency relationship. Such a presumption is without logic because it ignores decades of common law
agency principles.
The Sztorc court emphasized the rationales and assumptions underlying its adoption of the apparent agency doctrine. 176 The court
never applied those rationales or assumptions to the facts with
which it was confronted. For example, the court noted that the
doctrine was to be used in circumstances in which a patient goes to
a hospital that holds itself out as a full service institution on the
assumption that such patients go to the full service institution in
reliance upon the institution's reputation.17 7 It is unclear what the
Sztorc court meant when it spoke of a "holding out." When one
holds himself out, it is commonly understood that he is representing himself to be someone or something specific.' 7 He is, in essence, affirmatively representing himself in a particular way. Based
upon this definition, there was no evidence of a holding out in
Sztorc. The hospital did nothing to represent to the plaintiff that it
was a full service institution. It is equally unclear what the Sztorc
court meant when it spoke of a full service hospital. Logically, it
would seem that a full service hospital is one which offers all the
medical services, facilities, equipment, and specialists' services that
a modem day medical center is capable of offering. Following the
Sztorc court's rationale that the doctrine of apparent agency is to
be used in situations in which a patient goes to a full service hospital, hospitals that are unable to provide all possible services should
be free from attack under the apparent agency theory. Indeed,
174. See Beliflower AG Serv. Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 130 I1. App. 3d
80, 473 N.E.2d 998 (4th Dist. 1985); Devers v. Prudential Property and Casualty Co., 86
I1. App. 3d 542, 408 N.E.2d 462 (5th Dist. 1080).
175. See 146 11. App. 3d at 277, 496 N.E.2d at 1201.
176. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
178. "Hold out . . . 2: to represent to be. .. " Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 575 (1983).
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Northwest Hospital, the defendant in the Sztorc case, is just such a
hospital!'79
Even more importantly, the plaintiff in the Sztorc case did not
rely upon the hospital's reputation in seeking her radiation treatments at that institution. Instead, she was sent to that hospital at
the direction of her long-standing family physician, Dr. Schroe-

der,180 whose judgment she certainly must have trusted. Under the
circumstances, it seems likely that the plaintiff would have gone
wherever her family physician sent her. It seems unjust to hold a
hospital liable for the allegedly negligent acts of an independent
physician merely because it has the misfortune to be the institution
to which a patient's independent family doctor sends her for
treatment.
It is even more peculiar that the Sztorc court would hold the
hospital liable on an apparent agency theory when the plaintiff herself was unable to say that she would have gone elsewhere had she
known that the radiologists were not the agents or employees of
the hospital.'I There is no sound legal basis for imputing liability
to a hospital for the acts of independent contractors on an apparent
agency theory when there is no evidence that their status mattered
179. The Illinois Hospital Licensing Act defines a hospital as follows:
§ 3. As used in this Act:
(A) "Hospital" means any institution, place, building or agency, public or
private, whether organized for profit or not, devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for the diagnosis and treatment nr care of 2 or
more unrelated persons admitted for overnight stay or longer in o. ier to obtain
medical, including obstetric, psychiatric and nursing, care of illness, disease,
injury, infirmity, or deformity.
(a) any facility which is devoted primarily to providing psychiatric and related services programs for the diagnosis and treatment or care of 2 or more
unrelated persons suffering from emotional or nervous diseases;
(b) all places where pregnant females are received, cared for, or treated during delivery irrespective of the number of patients received.
The term "Hospital" includes general and specialized hospitals, tuberculosis
sanitaria. mental or psychiatric hospitals and sanitaria, and includes maternity
homes, lying-in homes, and homes for unwed mothers in which care is given
during delivery.
Hospital Licensing Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111'/2, para. 144 (1985). The above definition indicates that there are many different kinds of hospitals offering a variety of services. Such services range from basic bed and board for general medical patients to
isolettes for high risk neonates; from simple laboratory and radiological testing to complex and sophisticated testing possible only with the most technologically advanced
equipment; from general practice physicians to sub-specialists.
Northwest Hospital, now known as the John F. Kennedy Medical Center, is a community hospital, not a tertiary care medical center. Telephone conversation with Sister
Bonaventure Kusek, President of John F. Kennedy Medical Center (August 29, 1988).
180. See Sztorc 146 I1. App. 3d at 276, 496 N.E.2d at 1200.
181. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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to the plaintiff. Imputing liability demonstrates not a desire to
fairly determine which parties are rightfully in the lawsuit, but
rather a desire to keep the deep pocket institution in the suit at all
costs.
Despite a set of facts that strongly favored the hospital's position
relative to its motion for summary judgment, the Sztorc court
stated that Illinois courts have consistently found that the issue of
agency is a material question of fact such as to defeat a motion for
summary judgment.8 2 In so stating, the court ignored an entire
line of cases which holds that although the existence of an agency
relationship is generally a question of fact for the jury, it becomes a
question of law to be decided by the court when the relationship of
the parties is clear on the facts.' 83 A hospital in an apparent
agency case in Illinois now has less hope for resolution of the suit
on a dispositive motion prior to trial than if it is in the suit on a
direct negligence theory. An astute plaintiff's attorney need only
allege apparent agency along with his other theories of recovery to
assure the presence of the deep pocket for the duration of the litigation. Such a result is neither just to the institution nor is it well
grounded in law.
Considering the ease with which liability can be imputed to a
hospital under an apparent agency theory, plaintiffs' attorneys now
begin to shape their cases early in the litigation to support an apparent agency claim. Plaintiffs who have been well prepared by
their attorneys on the apparent agency issue routinely testify during their depositions that had they known a certain physician was
not the agent or employee of the defendant hospital, they would
have gone elsewhere for their care. Such testimony is suspect,
however, because in all likelihood their only option would be to go
to another, hospital whose emergency room physicians, radiologists, anesthesiologists, pathologists, and surgeons are also independent contractors. Surely, most patients go to a particular
hospital because that is where their trusted private physician sent
them. It is unlikely that they would go elsewhere, even if they
knew the true nature of the hospital-physician relationship. It is
182. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
183. See In re Estate of Rice, 130 Ill. App. 3d 416, 473 N.E.2d 1382 (2d Dist. 1985);
Wargel v. First Nat'l Bank, 121 Ill. App. 3d 730, 460 N.E.2d 331 (5th Dist. 1984); Farrell
v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 24 Ill. App. 3d 142, 320 N.E.2d 208 (1st Dist. 1974).
It has been the authors' experience that trial judges, based upon the Sztorc decision,
now routinely deny motions for summary judgment on behalf of hospitals in cases where
apparent agency is alleged, summarily stating that whether an agency relationship exists
is a question of fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
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doubtful that patients in need of emergency treatment would
forego that immediate treatment in order to go to another hospital
merely because they discovered that the emergency physician at
the initial hospital was an independent contractor. This is especially true when the emergency room physicians down the street
are probably also independent contractors. The reality of hospital
practice always has been, and will continue to be, that many different independent contractor physicians deliver care and treatment
to patients within the confines of the hospital. To hold the hospital, in addition to the independent contractor, liable defies this reality and serves no purpose other than to increase the funds available
to plaintiffs in the event they prevail at trial.
Despite the First District's adoption of the apparent agency doctrine in Sztorc, the Third District has refused to follow suit and has
held fast to the well-founded traditional rules of liability respecting
hospitals. In Greene v. Rogers,184 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Third District affirmed the trial court's granting of the defendant hospital's motion for summary judgment on the issue of
whether the emergency room physician was the actual or apparent
agent of the hospital.)8 5 The opinion is well reasoned and demonstrates a clear understanding of the interrelated concepts of actual
agency, apparent agency, and estoppel.
In Greene, the plaintiff's decedent entered the defendant hospital's emergency room with complaints of chest pains radiating to
the arm and diaphoresis. 86 She did so on the advice of her private
physician. 8 7 The emergency room physician, an independent contractor, ordered an electro-cardiogram and cardiac enzymes and
admitted her to a general hospital floor.18 8 While in the hospital,
the patient underwent various diagnostic tests and a surgical *consultation. Approximately six days after admission, another
electro-cardiogram and cardiac enzymes were performed which
conclusively revealed for the first time that she had suffered a heart
attack. The patient was transferred promptly to the coronary care
unit where she died the following day.
The plaintiff asserted that the emergency room physician was an
agent of the hospital, either by express agency, apparent agency, or
estoppel. 18 9 She alleged, therefore, that the hospital was vicari184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

147 I11.App. 3d 1009, 498
Id. at 1022, 498 N.E.2d at
Id. at 1012, 498 N.E.2d at
Id. at 1017, 498 N.E.2d at
Id. at 1012, 498 N.E.2d at
Id. at 1011-14, 498 N.E.2d

N.E.2d 867 (3d Dist. 1986).
876.
869.
872.
869.
at 869-70.
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ously liable under the doctrine of respondeatsuperior for the negligence of the physician in failing to diagnose her condition, failing
to admit the decedent directly to the coronary care unit, and by
allowing her to be put through extetisive physical testing when she
was suffering from a myocardial infarction. 19° The trial court
awarded the hospital summary judgment after finding that the
emergency room physician was not an agent of the hospital.' 9 '
The Greene court first addressed the actual agency issue and correctly noted that the two predominant factors in determining
whether a physician is an agent or independent contractor are the
control retained by the principal and method of payment. 92 The
plaintiff asserted that the hospital by-laws, policies, and procedures
maintained sufficient control over the emergency room physician
to qualify him as an agent of the hospital. She further alleged that
the emergency room physicians used hospital equipment and wore
hospital gowns, thereby implying that these facts further evidenced
93
control by the hospital.
The Greene court found that the hospital policies and procedures concerning emergency room physicians did not establish that
the hospital's control over the treatment of emergency room patients. In so finding, it demonstrated an understanding of the distinction between control over the method of organization and
operation, and control over the manner of medical treatment.
Although the hospital admittedly had some control over the emergency room relative to the admission, discharge, and referral of
patients, such organizational and operational control did not rise
to the level of control over a physician's treatment of a patient
based upon his medical judgment and diagnosis. 9, 4 The court reasoned that the emergency room policies and procedures were prescribed by law. 195 Control over the quality of emergency room
care was provided by the medical staff pursuant to the rules and
regulations of the Department of Health by way of the peer review
process. 96 Because peer review was a retrospective process, the
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1011-12, 498 N.E.2d at 869.
192. Id. at 1014-15, 498 N.E.2d at 871.
193. Id. at 1014, 498 N.E.2d at 870.
194. Id. at 1015, 498 N.E.2d at 871.
195. Id. The policies and procedures were prescribed by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111'/2,
para. 142 et seq. (1985) and the regulations of the Illinois Department of Public Health.
Section 3-2 of the rules and regulations of the Department of Public Health states that
"the physician shall be responsible for all aspects of general medical care." (emphasis
added).
196. Greene, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 1015, 498 N.E.2d at 871.
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Greene court correctly concluded that there were no means by
which the hospital administration could control the initial diagnosis and treatment of a patient in the emergency room. 97 The absence of control over the physician's medical decisionmaking
demanded that the independent relationship between the hospital
and physician be recognized. 98
Likewise, the Greene court found that the method of payment to
the emergency room physician did not support a finding of an
agency relationship. 99 The plaintiff alleged that the emergency
room physicians received their pay directly from the hospital .20
The evidence, however, revealed that the hospital paid thirty thousand dollars monthly to Scott Emergency Medical Services, Ltd.,
the physicians' professional corporation, which then paid the individual physicians. 20 1 The court found that there was no question
that the hospital did not pay the physicians directly.20 2 Consequently, there was no express agency relationship between the
emergency room physician and the defendant hospital.20 3
The Greene court then addressed the plaintiff's contention that
the emergency physician was the apparent agent of the hospital. 2°
The court noted that the doctrine of apparent agency is generally
thought of as a contract theory of recovery although some states
have carved an apparent agency exception for medical malpractice
actions.205 In an attempt to convince the court that the question of
apparent agency should have been submitted to a jury, the plaintiff
argued that there were disputed facts concerning whether the
emergency room physician had the apparent authority to act on
behalf of the hospital. 2 6 Specifically, he pointed to the facts that
the emergency room physicians regularly wore garments that bore
the hospital's insignia; that consent forms signed by patients prior
to treatment did not indicate that the emergency physicians were
employed by Scott Emergency Medical Services and not the hospi197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1015-16, 498 N.E.2d at 871.
200. Id. at 1014, 498 N.E.2d at 870.
201. Id. at 1015-16, 498 N.E.2d at 871.
202. Id. at 1016, -498 N.E.2d at S8.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. (citing Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1985); Williams v. St. Claire
Medical Center, 657 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. Ct App. 1983); Hannola v. Lakewood, 68 Ohio
App. 2d 61,426 N.E.2d 1187 (1980); Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 20 Wash. App. 98,
579 P.2d 970 (1978)).
206. Id.
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tal; that all equipment and staff were the property of, or employed
by, the hospital; and that the hospital did nothing to inform the
public that the emergency room physicians were not employees of
the hospital 0 7 The court found these facts to be undisputed and
decided that it needed only to apply the law to the undisputed facts
before it." ° Without referring to the First District's decision in
Sztorc, the Greene court succinctly concluded that "Illinois courts
have yet9 to recognize the exception and will not do so in this
20
case."
Lastly, the court addressed the plaintiff's allegations regarding
estoppel. 21 0 The court explained that the doctrine of estoppel requires that the injured party rely to his detriment upon the representations made by the person sought to be estopped. 21 The court
concluded that any representations relied upon by the plaintiff
were made by her attending physician, not the hospital, because it
was he who had referred her to the hospital for treatment. 1 2 The
plaintiff attempted to ely upon the fact that the emergency room
physician was wearing a hospital gown at the time he treated the
plaintiff, but the evidence was not conclusive in that regard. 213 2He
14
also pointed to the consent form and claimed reliance thereupon.
The plaintiff, not his deceased wife, however, had signed the consent form and reliance could therefore not be established. 2 5 Furthermore, neither the plaintiff nor the decedent had changed their
position to their detriment based upon these alleged representations. 21 6 Presumably the decedent would have gone to the defendant hospital even if she knew the emergency physicians were
independent contractors because her private physician had directed her to the hospital. In short, the Greene court concluded
that the doctrine of estoppel did not apply to the case.21 7
In an opinion consistent with Greene, the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Third District again confronted the issues of actual
207. Id.
208. In reality, the hospital disputed the plaintiff's allegation regarding the consent
form to the extent that he misquoted the form in his brief. The court decided, however,
that this was not the kind of dispute that need be resolved by a jury. Id..
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing Atwater v. Atwater, 18 I1. App. 3d 202, 309 N.E.2d 632 (1st Dist.
1974); Slavis v. Slavis, 12 I1. App. 3d 467, 299 N.E.2d 413 (1st Dist 1973)).
212. Id. at 1016-17, 498 N.E.2d at 872.
213. Id. at 1017, 498 N.E.2d at 872.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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and apparent agency in Johnson v. Sumner."' Johnson involved an
appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment on
behalf of the defendant hospital. 2 9 The plaintiff went to the hospital's emergency room, on the advice of her private physician, with
complaints of abdominal pain and with a subsequently positive
pregnancy test. The emergency room physician was an employee
of Hospital Emergency Physicians, S.C., which had contracted
with the hospital to provide physicians for the purpose of rendering emergency room medical services. The patient underwent surgery for an appendectomy but her complaints of abdominal pain
persisted after discharge. Two months later, she underwent surgery for a ruptured ectopic pregnancy that necessitated removal of
her fallopian tubes, thereby rendering her sterile.
The plaintiff alleged that the emergency room physician was the
agent of the hospital and that the hospital was therefore vicariously
liable for the allegedly negligent diagnosis and treatment of her
condition.2 20 At the hearing on the hospital's motion for summary
judgment, the trial court was presented with the uncontradicted
affidavit of the hospital's vice-president. The affidavit established
that a written agreement had been entered into between the hospital and the professional corporation whereby Hospital Emergency
Physicians, S.C., through a director chosen from the physicians by
the corporation, would exercise overall supervision of the care and
services provided in the emergency room, would directly bill patients for emergency services, and would provide training, education, and direction to the hospital staff regarding emergency care
services.22' In return, the hospital guaranteed a "cash flow" to the
corporation in the amount of forty thousand dollars per month.22
On appeal, the plaintiff asserted that the nature of the relationship between the hospital and emergency room physicians raised
factual questions that precluded the granting of summary judgment.223 The plaintiff also requested that the Third District reconsider its position of refusing to adopt the doctrine of apparent
agency in a medical malpractice action. 224
The r.ppellate court held firm to the position it took in the
Greene case and stated that the facts and circumstances found in
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

160 III. App. 3d. 173, 513 N.E.2d 149 (3d Dist. 1987).
Id. at 173-74, 513 N.E.2d at 150.
Id. at 174, 513 N.E.2d at 150.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175, 513 N.E.2d at 151.
Id.
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the Johnson case closely paralleled those cited by the plaintiff in
Greene.225 In a strong statement of rejection of the apparent
agency doctrine, the Johnson court explained that the doctrine ignores the realities of the typical hospital-physician relationship
wherein the physician controls the medical treatment a patient receives. Furthermore, the court indicated that application of the
apparent agency doctrine in a medical malpractice situation does
not promote the basic public policy of tort law that the tortfeasor,
rather than someone else, be financially responsible to the injured
party for his conduct.2 26 Any negligence of an examining physician should be imputed to the hospital only if the physician is
found to be the express agent of the hospital, not through an extension and application of the doctrine of apparent agency.227
Addressing the actual agency issue, the court looked at the facts
relavant to the control and method of payment and concluded that
they did not require a finding of an express agency. 228 The court
concluded that there were sufficient undisputed facts to decide the
issue as a matter of law and therefore affirmed the lower court's
granting of summary judgment.229
The Greene and Johnson cases clearly illustrate that the express
agency question can and should be resolved as a matter of law on a
motion for summary judgment when the relationship of the pvrties
is clear on the facts. They further demonstrate sound reasoning in
declining to utilize the apparent agency doctrine to impute liability
to the hospital for the acts of an independent contractor physician.
The Illinois Supreme Court has not yet resolved the conflict concerning the apparent agency issue that now exists between the First
and Third Districts. It is the hope and recommendation of the
authors that the Illinois Supreme Court will find the logic and reasoning of the Third District persuasive and for the aforementioned
reasons refuse to extend the apparent agency doctrine to medical
malpractice cases.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO HOSPITALS

Given the present state of the law and the uncertainity that the
future holds, hospitals would be wise to structure and conduct
225. Id.
226, Id.
227. Id. (citing Greene v. Rogers, 147 Il1. App. 3d 1009, 498 N.E.2d 867 (1986);
Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 Il1. App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d 198 (1979); Pickle v.
Curns, 106 Il1. App. 3d 734, 435 N.E.2d 877 (1982)).
228. Id. at 176, 513 N.E.2d at 151-52.
229. Id. at 177, 513 N.E.2d at 152.
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their affairs in a manner that will limit their potential liability
under the doctrine of apparent agency. The steps that hospitals
can take are many and varied. Many of the courts that have applied the doctrine focus upon the patient's understanding of the
relationship between hospital and health care providers. Accordingly, one of the first steps that hospitals should take is to educate
and advise patients about the nature of those relationships upon
their admission to the hospital and throughout their stay. 230 The
first opportunity to do so presents itself when the patient arrives at
the hospital. If the patient arrives for emergency care at a hospital
emergency room that is managed and/or staffed by independent
contractors, signs should be posted that alert the patient to the independent contractor status of the department. Likewise, if ancillary departments within the hospital, such as pathology and
radiology, are controlled by or staffed by independent contractors,
clearly posted signs should say so. 23 I These independent contractor departments should bear names that reflect their individual status, separate and distinct from the institution.
Alternatively, if the first opportunity to educate a patient does
not present itself until the patient arrives at the admission office,
then the initial notification of the health care providers' relationship with the hospital and the role of the hospital in the overall
treatment plan should be accomplished via the admission
paperwork.232 Patients are routinely asked to sign consents for
treatment. These documents should contain express statements
that make it clear that certain physicians and personnel within the
hospital are independent contractors and that they, not the hospital, will control the method and manner of treatment in their medical discretion. Emergency room consent-for-treatment forms and
surgical consents present233additional opportunities to educate in
much the same manner.
Additionally, so as to avoid or defeat any claims of misrepresentation, the hospital dress code or, at the very least, identification
badges, should reflect the status of the care providers vis-a-vis the
hospital.234 If an individual is an independent contractor or the
employee of an independent contractor, the color of his uniform
and the wording on his badge should so indicate. In no event
should garb with hospital insignia be worn by independent con230. See Levin, supra note 14, at 804.
231. See Phoenix & Schlueter, supra note 2, at 890.
232.

See Slawkowski, supra note 2, at 458.

233. See Phoenix & Schlueter, supra note 2, at 891.
234.

Id.
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tractor personnel.235
A patient who is advised promptly and repeatedly of the independent status of certain individuals rendering care within the
hospital will be hard pressed to show "good faith reliance" when
that reliance will be based on his own unreasonable misconceptions.236 It will become increasingly difficult to demonstrate any
misrepresentation by the hospital when it is actively striving to set
the record straight at every available opportunity.
Hospitals should also maintain separate billings for hospital-provided services and independent contractor-provided services. The
independent contractors should coordinate their own billing and
the bills should be free of any reference to the hospital. These bills
could also contain brief statements, similar to those found in the
consent forms, that advise the patients of the independent contractor status of the person or persons who provided the services.237
Whenever possible, hospitals should refrain from providing
equipment, forms, support services, or personnel to independent
contractor physicians or groups. In the event that it is necessary
for a hospital to provide these items to independent contractors, it
should do so through a leasing or rental agreement. In this way,
the hospital will avoid the appearance of controlling in any fashion
the activities of the independent contractors. Likewise, when a
hospital refers a patient to a particular physician, the patient
should be advised of the independent status of the individual.
Although courts seem reluctant to rely upon the written agreements between hospitals and their independent contractors in
resolving questions of agency, it would be wise to include an express provision to the effect that the hospital does not exercise any
control over the method or manner of treatment and that such
matters are left to the individual's medical discretion.23 8
A lucrative but controversial area in which hospitals could take
steps to limit their liability is in the realm of marketing strategies. 239 Numerous alternatives to traditional hospitals have surfaced in recent years in the form of surgi-centers, urgent care
centers, home health care services, and outpatient clinics. In order
to remain competitive in today's health care industry, hospitals
routinely advertise the existence of these alternative health care
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
hospital

Id.
Id.
Id. See also Slawkowski, supra note 2, at 458.
See Levin, supra note 14, at 804.
For a thorough discussion of the impact of the apparent agency doctrine upon
marketing stra egies, see Phoenix & Schlueter, supra note 2, at 886-90.
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services. Such advertisements usually mention the hospital's name
in association with the alternative health service thus implying a
relationship of some sort between the two. Despite their frequently
separate and distinct corporate identities, they will appear to the
lay person to be one in the same. Such situations are ripe for assertions of apparent agency in future malpractice cases. When appropriate, hospitals would be well advised to assure that their
advertisements communicate to the consumer that these alternate
health care services are provided by independent contractors. Of
course, the downside of doing so is that the hospital may suffer a
24
loss of market share.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, the doctrine of apparent agency is quickly gaining popularity as a method of imputing liability to a hospital for an
independent contractor's wrongdoing. Although the defense bar
should continue to educate the courts about the inappropriateness
of applying the doctrine to medical malpractice cases given the realities of hospital-physician relationships, it should simultaneously
counsel its institutional clients as to how they can manage their
affairs so as to limit their potential liability under the doctrine.
Apparent agency has been too readily applied in a confusing a.,d
conflicting manner. The underlying reason for extending the doctrine artificially to the hospital-physician relationship, can only be
to assure the continued presence of the deep-pocket institution in a
suit until the bitter end. The time has arrived for the high court of
this state to intervene and prevent further use and abuse of the
doctrine in this manner.

240. Id. at 887.

